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EMOCRATIC principles are critical to America's prosperity,
and the right of its citizens to decide for themselves how they
will be governed is a value deeply ingrained in its people. Amer-
icans celebrate this in various ways. They study the founding documents
of the United States even hundreds of years after they were written.
They speak, protest, donate, and vote in elections held across the country
every year. Nearly everyone agrees that these things are praiseworthy
and that the aspirations of self-government are noble.
However, the right to vote is only meaningful in a competitive system;
thus, America is a natural incubator for disagreement. This Comment is
about voting and disagreement. Specifically, it explores the debate over
the revocation of voting rights from convicted felons. There is much to
be debated on this issue, and only a small part of it will find its way onto
the following pages; however, what is included is an attempt to discuss
and defend a state's power to maintain this practice. Thus, this Comment
aims to provide a counterpoint to what has become the conventional wis-
dom of the academy: felon disenfranchisement is both untenable and
undesirable.
The first section of this Comment provides an overview of the Ameri-
can franchise and its history. This leads into a discussion of the current
debate over felon disenfranchisement and why it has become such an im-
portant issue. Part three then describes the constitutional baselines for
voting rights and felon disenfranchisement under the law as it now stands.
Part four begins by sketching an argument against these disenfranchise-
ment provisions. The arguments articulated by Professor Pamela Karlan
are described in detail, and the issues raised by her comments are identi-
* J.D. Candidate, Dedman School of Law at Southern Methodist University, 2007.
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fied and discussed. The section then provides a critique of her major
points, concluding that states still have sufficient power and purpose to
justify disenfranchising felons, even under modern conceptions of voting
rights.
II. CONTEXT AND CONTROVERSY
A. HISTORY AND OVERVIEW OF THE FRANCHISE IN AMERICA
At its beginning, the American franchise was limited to white male
property owners.' This attribute was the result of importing English legal
doctrines and traditions, which limited suffrage in similar ways. Laws in
Colonial America were loosely enforced, however, and land was cheaply
available, so from its beginning, suffrage was more widespread than in
England.2 Nevertheless, "there was no ideological consensus during the
eighteenth century in favor of universal white male suffrage."'3
Embracing this viewpoint and fearful of a heavily centralized political
structure, American constitutional framers limited the powers given to
the national government, granting states plenary authority to regulate the
franchise in both federal and state elections. 4 Thus, voting laws have al-
ways varied from state to state. While the wisdom of this system is be-
yond the scope of this article, there is no question that, for better or
worse, states have been "laboratories of experimentation" in voting
matters.
5
After the turn of the century, this narrow conception of the franchise
was challenged by a Puritan belief that "for purposes of secular politics,
people should be treated as if they were equal and, increasingly, by natu-
ral rights theories of political equality."'6 Land-ownership requirements
for voting began to lose popularity as universal white suffrage became the
ideal.7 Poll taxes were welcomed as a replacement for property require-
ments, a "liberalizing device" that opened access to the franchise. 8 By the
time of the Civil War, universal white male suffrage was the norm.9 Al-
though black suffrage was unpopular in both the North and the South
even after the war, Congress stepped in, passing the Reconstruction Act
of 1867, which made enfranchisement of blacks a condition southern
states had to satisfy for readmission to the Union. 10 The next year, the
Fourteenth Amendment was drawn up and ratified to ensure that there
1. DANIEL HAYS LOWENSTEIN & RICHARD L. HANSEN, ELECrION LAW: CASES AND
MATERIALS 30 (3d ed. 2004).
2. Id.
3. Id. at 31. "Before the Revolution, the prevailing political theory was influenced by
Aristotle's idea of balanced government, which held that tyranny would result if either the
monarchical, the aristocratic, or the democratic principle dominated the others." Id.
4. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 4, cl. 1; id. art. II, § 1.
5. New State Ice Co. v. Liebmann, 285 U.S. 262, 311 (1932) (Brandeis, J., dissenting).
6. LOWENSTEIN & HANSEN, supra note 1, at 31.
7. Id.
8. Id.
9. Id. at 32.
10. Id.
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was no question as to Congress's power to pass such anti-discriminatory
statutes." Although the structure of state and federal power changed
dramatically with the adoption of the Fourteenth Amendment, it did not
prohibit discrimination in voting outright.12
Section Two of the Fourteenth Amendment, however, was written with
the purpose of discouraging states from disenfranchising their constitu-
ents.13 It did this by mandating a reduction in a state's congressional rep-
resentation proportional to the number of twenty-one year-old males
who were excluded from the franchise for any reason other than "rebel-
lion, or other crime[.]"' 14 Thus, states which excluded otherwise legal vot-
ers from the franchise would pay a political price in Washington.
Black suffrage became the law in 1879 with the ratification of the Fif-
teenth Amendment, providing that the right of citizens to vote "shall not
be denied or abridged [on] account of race, color, or previous condition
of servitude."' 15 But the battle was far from over in the south. Over the
next several decades, Southern Democrats erected various barriers to
black suffrage. 16 Previously legitimate devices for regulating the
franchise, such as secret ballots, poll taxes, and literacy tests, became
weapons against black voters.' 7 The battle for black suffrage continued
slowly and violently, climaxing with the Civil Rights Movement, which
led to the enactment of the Voting Rights Act and the Twenty-Fourth
Amendment, providing that the right of any citizen to vote in any federal
presidential or congressional election "shall not be denied or abridged
[by] reason of failure to pay any poll tax or other tax."'18
In the wake of these changes, the movement for women's suffrage be-
gan in the mid-nineteenth century'9 and culminated in 1920 with the rati-
11. STONE, ET AL., CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 432 (4th ed. 2001). Section One states that
[n]o state shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge the privileges or
immunities of citizens of the United States, nor shall any State deprive any
person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law; nor deny any
person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws.
U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
12. See U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
13. Its text reads:
Representatives shall be apportioned among the several States according to
their respective numbers, counting the whole number of persons in each
State, excluding Indians not taxed. But when the right to vote at any election
for the choice of electors for President and Vice President of the United
States, Representatives in Congress, the Executive and Judicial officers of a
State, or the members of the Legislature thereof, is denied to any of the male
inhabitants of such State, being twenty-one years of age, and citizens of the
United States, or in any way abridged, except for participation in rebellion,
or other crime, the basis of representation therein shall be reduced in the
proportion which the number of such male citizens shall bear to the whole
number of male citizens twenty-one years of age in such State.
U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 2.
14. See id.
15. Id. amend. XV.
16. LOWENSTEIN & HANSEN, supra note 1, at 35.
17. Id. at 34-35.
18. See U.S. CONST. amend. XXIV.
19. LOWENSTEIN & HANSEN, supra note 1, at 33-36.
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fication of the Nineteenth Amendment.2 0 More than fifty years later, the
Constitution was amended once again to expand the franchise with the
Twenty-Sixth Amendment, which lowered the voting age to eighteen.2'
This completes a picture of the development of the American
franchise. When our nation began, the franchise was limited to "prop-
erty-owning, taxpaying white males over the age of twenty-one. '2 2 Since
that time, the history of the franchise in the United States has been one of
gradual expansion.2 3 Political scientist E.E. Schattschneider stated that
"one of the easiest victories of the democratic cause in American history
has been the extension of the suffrage .... [t]he struggle for the ballot
was almost bloodless, almost completely peaceful, and astonishingly
easy," and most scholars tend to agree. 24 While the interests driving pro-
gress were diverse and often motivated by something other than equal-
ity, 25 the result is the nearly universal suffrage we embrace today. "The
dominant assumption in the literature today is that 'at least since the vot-
ing rights reforms of the 1960s, political rights have been universalized in
the United States. With relatively insignificant exceptions, all adult citi-
zens have the full complement of political rights." 26
B. THE FELON DISENFRANCHISEMENT CONTROVERSY
Scholars are quick to point out these "exceptions" to universal suf-
frage, and many vehemently argue that they are anything but "insignifi-
cant."'2 7 While the voting rights battlefield has many fronts, the debate
over felon disenfranchisement has taken center stage in recent years, due
largely to the potential effects a change in these laws would have on polit-
20. See U.S. CONST. amend. XIX.
21. STONE ET AL., supra note 11, at 740-41. Prior to this amendment, the majority of
states set the minimum voting age at twenty-one. LOWENSTEIN & HANSEN, supra note 1, at
40.
22. Pamela S. Karlan, Ballots and Bullets: The Exceptional History of the Right to Vote,
71 U. CIN. L. REV. 1345, 1345 (2003).
23. LOWENSTEIN & HANSEN, supra note 1, at 29. Not all scholars wholly accept this
view. These authors note that the change "has usually been in the direction of allowing
more people to vote in more elections that increasingly have controlled the most important
aspects of government policymaking" but that "we should not assume that the direction of
change has always been toward extension of the franchise," because resident aliens saw
their right to vote revoked during the nineteenth century and Southern states severely
impeded African American suffrage during the early twentieth century. Id. See also Chris-
topher Uggen & Jeff Manza, Democratic Contraction? Political Consequences of Felon
Disenfranchisement in the United States, 67 AM. Soc. REV. 777, 778 (2002) (referring to
restrictions on the voting rights of felons as "a rare and potentially significant counter-
example to the universalization of the franchise in democratic societies").
24. Compare Uggen & Manza, supra note 23, at 780 (citing Schattschneider favorably)
with Nora V. Demleitner, Continuing Payment on One's Debt to Society: The German
Model of Felon Disenfranchisement as an Alternative, 84 MINN. L. REV. 753, 765-66 (2000)
(citing Schattschneider disapprovingly).
25. Theories explaining the expanding franchise have laid credit at the feet of Puritan
beliefs, natural rights theory, political advantage, fear of slave rebellion, and war. See
LOWENSTEIN & HANSEN, supra note 1, at 1-32; Karlan, supra note 22, at 1345-46.
26. Uggen & Manza, supra note 23, at 780 (citation omitted).
27. See infra note 40 and sources cited.
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ical outcomes.28 This portion of the article will describe the nature of
these laws and why they are the subject of such heated debate.
Contrary to popular lore, 29 Americans did not invent felon disen-
franchisement to exclude African-Americans from voting. The practice
has Mediterranean origins; ancient Greek society imposed atimia on
criminal offenders, pronouncing "civil death" upon them and stripping
them of many citizenship rights, including the right to vote. 30 Likewise,
Romans punished particular offenders with infamia, which included loss
of voting privileges.3 1 These ideas spread to England, and the practice
found its place in English common law under the idea of attainder, which
revoked rights from anyone convicted of treason or specific felonies.
32
Early American colonies adopted much of English legal doctrine and tra-
ditions, and felon disenfranchisement laws gained a foothold in the
United States to a somewhat lesser extent than they did in England.
33
Thus, rather than inventing the statutes to decrease minority voters,
"states have punished malefactors by restricting the fundamental rights of
citizenship, including rights of political participation" since the United
States became a nation.34
The fight did not begin until the late 1950s, when several public-interest
groups took aim at felon disenfranchisement laws across the country.
35
Seeking to transform the focus of the American penal system from retri-
bution and deterrence to rehabilitation and integration, these progressive
groups believed that disenfranchisement cut felons off from society and
thus increased the likelihood of recidivism. However, rehabilitative theo-
ries of punishment fell out of favor in the United States in the face of
rapidly escalating crime rates.36 And although the felons' rights move-
28. See infra notes 63-68 and accompanying text.
29. See Roger Clegg, Perps and Politics: Why Felons Can't Vote, NAT'L REV. ONLINE,
Oct. 18, 2004, available at http://www.nationalreview.com/clegg/clegg200410180844.asp
(discussing prominent newspapers which erroneously tie felon disenfranchisement to
racism).
30. Jeff Manza & Christopher Uggen, Punishment and Democracy: Disenfranchise-
ment of Nonincarcerated Felons in the United States, 2 PERSP. ON POL., 491, 491, 492 (2004).
31. Id.
32. Demleitner, supra note 24, at 765-66.
33. Id. Demleitner noted that "the United States rejected some of this common law
heritage," adhering
[to] a lesser form of "civil death" than England did .... The Constitution, for
example, abolished forfeiture for treason and corruption of blood. In the
second half of the twentieth century, many of the surviving consequences of
'civil death' statutes, such as the inability to enter into contracts or to inherit
property, were abolished in American states.
Id.
34. Manza & Uggen, supra note 30, at 492.
35. Demleitner, supra note 24, at 766. Such groups included the National Conference
on Uniform State Laws, the American Law Institute, the National Probation and Parole
Association, the National Advisory Commission on Criminal Justice Standards and Goals,
and the President's Commission on Law Enforcement and the Administration of Justice.
36. STEVEN D. LEVITr & STEPHEN J. DUBNER, FREAKONOMICS: A ROGUE ECONO-
MIST EXPLORES THE HIDDEN SIDE OF EVERYTHING 122-23 (2005).
During the first half of the twentieth century, the incidence of violent crime
in the United States was, for the most part, fairly steady. But in the early
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ment gained traction abroad, 37 efforts to use the judiciary as a vehicle to
attack felon disenfranchisement provisions in the United States came to
an abrupt end in Richardson v. Ramirez.38 This case, discussed in fuller
detail below, held that Section Two of the Fourteenth Amendment pro-
vides an affirmative constitutional sanction for states that seek to adopt
felon disenfranchisement laws.39 As a result of this holding, the issue all
but disappeared during the seventies and eighties. But since that time,
particularly in the last decade, the movement has regained much of its
former momentum, and today there is an avalanche of scholarly condem-
nation of the current felon disenfranchisement laws.40
Today, nearly every state disenfranchises convicted felons, and nearly
every article on the subject begins by reciting the scope and impact of
these laws, often in hyperbolic language. But many facts are quite clear.
Forty-eight states and the District of Columbia only allow people not im-
prisoned for a felony to vote.41 Thirty-six states withhold restoration of
voting privileges until felons have successfully completed their parole.42
Thirty-one of these states wait until felons complete their probation as
well. 43 Only Maine and Vermont impose no voting restrictions on con-
victed felons. 44 Stated another way, convicted felons automatically
regain the right to vote upon completing their sentence, parole and pro-
bationary periods in thirty-eight states and the District of Columbia.
1960s, it began to climb. In retrospect, it is clear that one of the major factors
pushing this trend was a more lenient justice system.
Id. However, conservative campaigns to restore retributive punishments changed the na-
ture of the laws dramatically. "The evidence linking increased punishment with lower
crime rates is very strong. Harsh prison terms have been shown to act as both deterrent...
and prophylactic . . . . [llogical as this may sound, some criminologists have fought the
logic." Id. He includes a priceless quote: "Apparently, it takes a Ph.D. in criminology to
doubt that keeping dangerous criminals incarcerated cuts crime." Id. I include these com-
ments here because many critics of disenfranchisement still rely on these arguments and
favor rehabilitative criminal theories.
37. Some other nations, such as Germany, have modified their laws under the influ-
ence of these ideas. Demleitner, supra note 24, at 767.
38. See Richardson v. Ramirez, 418 U.S. 24, 56 (1974) (holding that felon disen-
franchisement laws did not violate equal protection, because Section Two of the Four-
teenth Amendment explicitly exempts such laws from equal protection scrutiny). See also
infra notes 81-114, and accompanying text.
39. Richardson, 418 U.S. at 54.
40. See, e.g., John R. Cosgrove, Four New Arguments Against the Constitutionality of
Felony Disenfranchisement, 26 T. JEFFERSON L. REV. 157, 163-73 (2004); Demleitner, supra
note 24, at 755-56; Virginia E. Hench, The Death of Voting Rights: The Legal Disen-
franchisement of Minority Voters, 48 CASE W. RES. L. REv. 727, 738-44 (1998); Afi S. John-
son-Parris, Felon Disenfranchisement: The Unconscionable Social Contract Breached, 89
VA. L. REV. 109, 133-36, (2003); Manza & Uggen, supra note 30, at 492-93; Mark E.
Thompson, Don't Do the Crime if You Ever Intend to Vote Again: Challenging the Disen-
franchisement of Ex-Felons as Cruel and Unusual Punishment, 33 SETON HALL L. REV.
167, 168-69, 200-01 (2002).
41. THE SENTENCING PROJECT, FELONY DISENFRANCHISEMENT LAWS IN THE UNITED
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Nine states automatically restore voting privileges once a preset waiting
period passes,4 5 and in two others, felons can vote from their prison
cells. 46 At this point, we are left with what might appear to be a rather
underwhelming controversy. Only three states permanently deny con-
victed felons the right to vote, and each of these has defined a process
which, if completed, restores voting rights.47 Unfortunately for oppo-
nents of these provisions, the restrictions described above are not intui-
tively outrageous or likely to provoke public outcry.
Currently, felon disenfranchisement laws are in flux. The trend within
the United States has not been to eliminate these laws or to increase their
severity but instead toward what appears to be equilibrium. On the one
hand, several states with existing felon disenfranchisement provisions
have relaxed their effects. "'In the past decade, the trend at the state
level has been very clear. In the majority of cases, states have made [vot-
ing] laws less restrictive' for ex-felons.' '48 Delaware amended its constitu-
tion in 2000 to end its practice of permanent disenfranchisement of all
felons. 4 9 In 2001, Connecticut passed a law restoring voting rights to
felons upon completion of probation.50 Maryland amended its laws and
abandoned its practice of permanently disenfranchising all felons in
2002.51 In 2003, Alabama passed a statute to allow felons to apply for a
certificate of eligibility to vote after completing their sentence.52 Be-
tween 1997 and 2005, similar changes took place in Iowa, Kentucky, Ne-
braska, Nevada, New Mexico, Pennsylvania, Texas, and Wyoming.5 3 So
in eight years, twelve states-several among the most conservative in the
nation-relaxed their restrictions on felon voting. One study found that
since 1975, thirteen states have expanded the franchise to felons in some
way, while eleven states have passed further restrictions, and three others
have moved in both directions.54
Several states, however, did exactly the opposite during this period.
Two states which have never disenfranchised felons-Utah and Massa-
chusetts-recently enacted provisions doing exactly that.5 5 In 1998, Utah
voters approved a state amendment prohibiting persons currently incar-
45. Id. Delaware and Wyoming require a five-year waiting period, Maryland requires
three years, and Nebraska two.
46. Id.
47. These stares are Florida, Kentucky, and Virginia. SENTENCING PROJECT, supra
note 41, at 1.
48. Joyce Howard Price, Vermont, Maine Allow Felon Votes; Maryland Bill Studies
Privilege, WASH. TIMES, Jan. 29, 2006, at Al, available at http://www.washtimes.com/na-
tional/20060128-104343-6528r.htm.





54. Jeff Manza, et al., Public Attitudes Toward Felon Disenfranchisement in the United
States, 68 PuB. OPINION Q. 275, 276 (2004), available at http://www.soc.umn.edu/-uggen/
ManzaBrooksUggen_POQ_04.pdf.
55. SENTENCING PROJECT, supra note 41, at 2.
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cerated from voting.56 Likewise, in 2000, Massachusetts voters approved
a constitutional amendment to the same effect.57 Kansas took a step in
the same direction in 2002, passing a statute which extended the prohibi-
tion on voting to felons who are still serving parole.58
Thus, states, through democratic-not judicial-processes, constantly
modify their felon disenfranchisement policies, but not uniformly.
"Since 1975, thirteen states have liberalized their laws, eleven states have
passed further limitations on felons, and three states have passed both
types of laws. '' 59 A recent study suggests that a majority of the public
favors restoration of voting rights to felons who are out of prison,60 but
felon disenfranchisement is clearly not unpopular among state legislators.
Were this the case, one would expect states troubling themselves to
amend these statutes would instead repeal them. Instead, several states
have repealed portions of their statutes, but all stopped far short of
sweeping expansions of suffrage. The trend, if it can be said that one
exists, is toward reform rather than a rejection of disenfranchisement
statutes.
Perhaps more surprisingly, it appears possible that constituents on both
sides of the political aisle approve of felon disenfranchisement. Consider
that the two states which most recently adopted felon disenfranchisement
provisions for the first time are Utah, in 1998, and Massachusetts, in 2000.
There is irony in this juxtaposition. Utah is a state in which President
George W. Bush carried 71.1% of the vote in the last presidential elec-
tion-the strongest pro-Bush state in the union.61 And, in Massachusetts,
62.1% of the electorate supported John F. Kerry in the 2004 race, making
it the strongest pro-Kerry state.62 Identical action by such politically dif-
ferent states may provide more questions than answers.
In 2002, two leading voting-rights scholars published an article which
greatly increased the stakes in this issue. Their conclusion was simple:
that "there are reasons to believe that felon disenfranchisement has not
had a neutral impact on the American political system. '63 They noted
that the Democratic voting base may be significantly eroded by felon dis-
enfranchisement, 64 estimating that 1.8 million felons and ex-felons cur-
rently disenfranchised are African-American. 65 Coupled with historical
patterns indicating that African-Americans are overwhelmingly Demo-




59. Manza & Uggen, supra note 30, at 499.
60. Manza et al., supra note 54, at 280.
61. See USA Today Election 2004, http://www.usatoday.com/news/politicselections/
vote2004/results.htm (follow "President by State" hyperlink) (last visited Sept. 16, 2006).
62. Id.
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population is not insignificant. 66 Additionally, the white population of
felons and ex-felons is primarily poor or working class, and thus a large
portion of these would also vote for Democratic candidates. 67 In the end,
the authors concluded that "felon disenfranchisement laws, combined
with high rates of criminal punishment, may have altered the outcome of
as many as seven recent U.S. Senate elections and at least one presiden-
tial election. ' 68 Assuming their conclusions are correct, the motives for a
bitter political and legal battle become immediately clear.
III. VOTING, DISENFRANCHISEMENT, AND
CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS
A. VOTING AS A FUNDAMENTAL RIGHT
Before describing the current arguments against felon disenfranchise-
ment laws, a discussion of the core legal doctrines is edifying. Up until
the 1960s, courts generally yielded to the states' determinations of voting
qualifications where there was no express prohibition on the restraint. 69
For example, the Supreme Court unanimously upheld a $1 poll tax in
Georgia in 193770 and, in 1959, a North Carolina statute requiring that
voters be able to "read and write any section of the [state constitution] in
the English language. 7 1
However, this deference came to an abrupt end during the Warren era.
The Court announced in Reynolds v. Sims that
[the] right of suffrage is a fundamental matter in a free and demo-
cratic society. Especially since the right to exercise the franchise in a
free and unimpaired manner is preservative of other basic civil and
political rights, any alleged infringement of the right of citizens to
vote must be carefully and meticulously scrutinized. 72
This marked the birth of "one person, one vote" and chaos in the state
legislatures, who were compelled by the opinion to redraw the district
lines throughout the nation. Chief Justice Warren would later say that
this decision was the most important of his tenure, and its sweeping ef-
fects on the American political system cannot be questioned. Further,
the declaration of voting as a "fundamental right" altered the legal frame-
work of franchise restrictions7 3 and was the genesis of a new series of
66. Id.
67. Id. at 780-81.
68. Id. at 794.
69. STONE ET AL., supra note 11, at 741.
70. Id. (citing Breedlove v. Scuttles, 302 U.S. 277 (1937))
71. Id. (citing Lassiter v. Northampton County Bd. of Elections, 360 U.S. 45 (1959)).
72. Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533, 561-62 (1964).
73. Under the Equal Protection Clause, courts employ different standards of review
depending on the right and classification at issue. Classifications on the basis of race, for
example, are considered "suspect" because it is thought that laws containing such provi-
sions are likely to hinder the targeted class. Thus, the court developed what is called "strict
scrutiny" to analyze such laws. Under this framework, the state carries the burden to show
that the law at issue is narrowly tailored to serve a compelling state interest-a burden that
has been historically very difficult to meet. When strict scrutiny is applied, a statute will
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legal challenges to the electoral system. The strongest arguments against
felon disenfranchisement rest ultimately on this doctrine-the fundamen-
tal nature of the right to vote. Within legal circles, the debate over this
decision continues,74 but there is no doubt that Reynolds is firmly en-
trenched in our nation's law and culture.
B. DISENFRANCHISEMENT AND THE SUPREME COURT
This declaration-that voting is a fundamental right-is the touchstone
of modem felon disenfranchisement law, but challenges to disen-
franchisement for unlawful acts had come before the Court as early as the
nineteenth century. Two cases, Davis v. Beason75 and Murphy v. Ram-
sey, 76 often referred to as the "Mormon Cases," challenged state statutes
excluding polygamists from the franchise. Ramsey concerned a Utah
plaintiff who argued that the disenfranchisement provision was essen-
tially a criminal punishment without prosecution. 77 However, the Court
disagreed, stating that it is "precisely similar to an inquiry into the fact of
nativity, of age, or of any other status made necessary by law as a condi-
tion of the elective franchise. ' 78 It then hinted at its view of the state's
power to regulate voting:
It would be quite competent for the sovereign power to declare that
no one but a married person shall be entitled to vote; and in that
event the election officers would be authorized to determine for that
occasion, in case of question in any instance, upon the fact of mar-
riage as a continuing status.79
The Beason Court upheld a similar Idaho statute in the face of a First
Amendment challenge, holding that the law was simply a prescription of
reasonable voter qualifications. 80 Neither of these cases, however, dealt
with felon disenfranchisement per se-the plaintiffs had not been con-
victed of polygamy but merely deprived of the right to vote under a state
regulatory scheme.
The first and only Supreme Court decision squarely addressing felon
disenfranchisement in the modern era is Richardson v. Ramirez.81 In Ra-
almost always fail, and thus lawyers who wish to attack a statute will attempt to show that
it targets a "suspect class." Like suspect classifications, "fundamental interests" are also
reviewed by the court under strict scrutiny. See generally ERWIN CHEMERINSKY, CONSTI-
TUTIONAL LAW: PRINCIPLES AND POLICIES 517-20 (2d ed. 2002).
74. Robert Bork, nominee to the Supreme Court, was not confirmed by the Senate in
part because of his writings critical of the "one person, one vote" holding. Likewise, the
recent nominations of Chief Justice John Roberts and Justice Samuel Alito did not pass
without questioning from senators about the nominees' views on Reynolds v. Sims. Bork's
critique is still valuable to those who study this debate. See ROBERT H. BORK, THE TEMPT-
ING OF AMERICA: THE POLITICAL SEDUCTION OF THE LAW 84-90 (1990).
75. 133 U.S. 333 (1890).
76. 114 U.S. 15 (1885).
77. Id. at 40-44.
78. Id. at 43.
79. Id.
80. Beason, 133 U.S. at 346.
81. 418 U.S. 24 (1974).
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mirez, three felons who had completed their sentences filed a writ of
mandate to the Supreme Court of California, asserting that the state con-
stitutional and statutory provisions denying them voting opportunity vio-
lated the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. 82 The
California constitution, adopted in 1879, contained a provision that
"'[laws] shall be made' to exclude from voting persons convicted of brib-
ery, perjury, forgery, malfeasance in office, 'or other high crimes."' 83
Further, at the time petitioners filed suit, article II of the state constitu-
tion additionally provided that
[n]o alien ineligible to citizenship, no idiot, no insane person, no per-
son convicted of any infamous crime, no person hereafter convicted
of the embezzlement or misappropriation of public money, and no
person who shall not be able to read the Constitution in the English
language and write his or her name, shall ever exercise the privileges
of an elector in this State.84
The petitioners prevailed in the state court, but the United States Su-
preme Court reversed and held that felon disenfranchisement provisions
did not violate the United States Constitution in a 6-3 decision. 85
The majority opinion, written by Justice Rehnquist, focused on the ex-
plicit text and an original understanding of the Fourteenth Amendment.8 6
Specifically, the Court found its answer by looking beyond the com-
monly-referenced Section One, to Section Two, which pertains to voting
in the states:
Representatives shall be apportioned among the several States ac-
cording to their respective numbers, counting the whole number of
persons in each State, excluding Indians not taxed. But when the
right to vote at any election for the choice of electors for President
and Vice President of the United States, Representatives in Con-
gress, the Executive and Judicial officers of a State, or the members
of the Legislature thereof, is denied to any of the male inhabitants of
such State, being twenty-one years of age, and citizens of the United
States, or in any way abridged, except for participation in rebellion, or
other crime, the basis of representation therein shall be reduced in
the proportion which the number of such male citizens shall bear to
the whole number of male citizens twenty-one years of age in such
State.87
The Court reasoned that this imposes a sanction on any state which de-
prives otherwise qualified citizens suffrage, unless it does so based on
conviction for a felony.88 As a result, it seems that felon disenfranchise-
ment could not violate Section One of the Amendment, because the
82. Id. at 31.
83. Id. at 27 (citing CAL. CONST. art. XX, § 11).
84. Id. at 27-28 (citing CAL. CONST. art. II, § 1 (repealed 1972)).
85. Id. at 56.
86. Id. at 42-52.
87. U. S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 2 (quoted in Ramirez, 418 U.S. at 42-43) (emphasis
added by Court).
88. Ramirez, 418 U.S. at 43.
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Framers, in their next breath, approved of such practice.89 The Court
found that this argument would be persuasive enough to carry the day
"unless it can be shown that the language of [Section Two (italicized
above)] was intended to have a different meaning than would appear
from its face." 90
Moving on to an Originalism analysis, the Court noted that "legislative
history bearing on the meaning of the relevant language of Section Two is
scant indeed" since the framers were more concerned with the reduced
representation of the states rather than the exempted forms of disen-
franchisement.91 However, what legislative history could be found surely
indicates that the language was intended by Congress to "mean what it
says."'92
The language at issue was introduced by Senator Williams of Oregon at
Joint Committee; the committee approved it overwhelmingly, and the
draft Amendment was sent to the House floor without change.93 During
the entire course of the floor debates in both congressional houses, the
language "except for participation in rebellion, or other crime" was not
once modified. 94 Several representatives noted the evident result of the
clause at issue-that states may disenfranchise criminals without sacrific-
ing representation-while debating other aspects of the amendment. 95
Other convincing evidence was also discussed. At the time of the ratifica-
tion of the Fourteenth Amendment, twenty-nine of thirty-seven states
had constitutional provisions allowing or requiring that individuals con-
victed of felonies or "infamous crimes" be excluded from the franchise. 96
Moreover, Congress, at the time of the Amendment's ratification, re-
quired that Southern states seeking readmission to the union allow dele-
gates of "whatever race, color, or previous condition ... except such as
may be disenfranchised for participation in the rebellion or for felony at
common law."' 97 The Court showed such an exception to be common to
the voter qualification clauses at the time.98 Finally, the Court noted that,
although this was its first holding related to felon disenfranchisement, two
cases decided in the late nineteenth century approved of excluding biga-
mists from the franchise.99 Lassiter v. Northampton County Board of
Elections'0° approved of excluding felons from voting in dicta, and the





93. Id. at 44.
94. Id. at 45.
95. Id. at 45-48.
96. Id. at 48.
97. Id. at 48-49.
98. Id. at 49-50.
99. Id. at 53
100. 360 U.S. 45, 51 (1959).
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tional challenges to state felon disenfranchisement laws. 1° 1 In sum, the
Court held there is no reason to believe that the ratification Congress
believed passage of the Fourteenth Amendment would affect existing
felon disenfranchisement laws at all.
Finally, the Court directly addressed the respondents, who submitted
that the Court's recent interpretation of the Equal Protection Clause re-
quired that felon disenfranchisement laws be subject to strict scrutiny. 10 2
But unlike Section One, Section Two of the amendment includes an af-
firmative sanction of felon disenfranchisement "which was not present in
the case of the other restrictions on the franchise which were invalidated
in the cases on which respondents rely."'01 3 Rather, the original under-
standing of the Framers and ratifiers of the Fourteenth Amendment is
controlling, and the Court
rest[s] on the demonstrably sound proposition that Section One, in
dealing with voting rights as it does, could not have been meant to
bar outright a form of disenfranchisement which was expressly ex-
empted from the less drastic sanction of reduced representation
which Section Two imposed for other forms of disenfranchise-
ment. 04
The Court, 6-3, gave merely a nod of acknowledgement to the amici
curiae who contend that felon disenfranchisement is "outmoded" and
should be replaced with a more modern view of rehabilitation. 10 5 Justice
Rehnquist, in response, pointed to judicial restraint, noting that he
[W]ould by no means discount these arguments if addressed to the
legislative forum which may properly weigh and balance them
against those advanced in support of California's present constitu-
tional provisions. But it is not for us to choose one set of values over
the other. If respondents are correct, and the view which they advo-
cate is indeed the more enlightened and sensible one, presumably
the people of the State of California will ultimately come around to
that view. And if they do not do so, their failure is some evidence, at
least, of the fact that there are two sides to the argument.10 6
The dissent's argument, now over thirty years old, resembles the main
thrust of most recent scholarship on this issue. Justice Marshall argued
that Section Two was designed as an "out" for Southern states, which
sought to discriminate against African-Americans, and that the provision
in Section Two could not act as a limitation on the other sections of the
Amendment.1 0 7 Finally, he reasoned that that the statute failed strict
101. Ramirez, 418 U.S. at 53 (citing Fincher v. Scott, 352 F. Supp. 117 (M.D.N.C. 1972),
affd, 411 U.S. 961 (1973); Beacham v. Braterman, 300 F. Supp. 182 (S.D. Fla. 1969), aff'd
396 U.S. 12 (1969)).
102. Id. at 54.
103. Id.
104. Id. at 55.
105. Id.
106. Id.
107. Id. at 73-74 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
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scrutiny.' 0 8 Although preventing election fraud is a compelling state in-
terest, the disenfranchisement provision in question was hopelessly over-
and under-inclusive to this goal-some voting crimes were not felonies,
and there was no rational relationship between the crimes most felons
commit and voter fraud.10 9 Moreover, felons have a legitimate interest in
the democratic process and cannot be excluded based on the manner in
which they might cast a vote.1 10
Ramirez, however, should not be read to be a rubber stamp exempting
all felon disenfranchisement statutes from Equal Protection scrutiny. In
1985, the Court heard a challenge to Alabama laws disenfranchising
felons on the basis that they were passed with a discriminatory motive-
disenfranchisement of African-Americans. 1 ' The Hunter v. Underwood
plaintiffs were convicted for presenting worthless checks-a crime of
"moral turpitude" that, under Alabama statute, meant disenfranchise-
ment.1 1 2 The Court, examining the state constitutional provision in ques-
tion, found that it was indeed drafted and passed by the Alabama
convention for the express purpose of disenfranchising blacks. 113 It
found damning evidence in the legislative history, noting that the presi-
dent of the convention stated in his opening address: "And what is it that
we want to do? Why it is within the limits imposed by the Federal Consti-
tution, to establish white supremacy in this State."1 14 With such stark
evidence of discriminatory intent, the Supreme Court reasoned that Sec-
tion Two would not act as a shield for racially discriminatory laws." 5
Thus purely discriminatory disenfranchisement statutes, though they fall
within the Section Two exception, will nevertheless be violative of the
Equal Protection Clause if they are adopted for discriminatory purposes.
IV. CHALLENGES TO FELON DISENFRANCHISEMENT
With the historical and legal background in place, the next section will
describe and critique several challenges to felon disenfranchisement pro-
visions. Various scholars have developed legal and philosophical argu-
ments attacking the practice, but very little has been written in its
defense. The following critique addresses the feasibility of felon disen-
franchisement statutes in light of our modern view of voting rights and
considers whether they remain philosophically tenable or serve any legiti-
mate nonpenal purpose. Much of the following discussion is based on the
often-cited work of Professor Pamela S. Karlan.116 The following subsec-
108. Id. at 78-85.
109. Id. at 79.
110. Id. at 78.
111. Hunter v. Underwood, 471 U.S. 222 (1985).
112. Id. at 223-24.
113. Id. at 233.
114. Id. at 229 (citing 1 OFFICIAL PROCEEDINGS OF THE CONSTITUTIONAL CONVENTION
OF THE STATE OF ALABAMA, MAY 21, 1901 TO SEPTEMBER 3, 1901 8 (1940)).
115. Id. at 233.
116. See Pamela S. Karlan, Convictions and Doubts: Retribution, Representation, and
the Debate over Felon Disenfranchisement, 56 STAN. L. REV. 1147, 1149-50 (2004).
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tion will describe Karlan's, Convictions and Doubts: Retribution, Repre-
sentation, and the Debate over Felon Disenfranchisement,"i7 in which she
argues that disenfranchisement is punishment, not regulation, and as such
it cannot withstand scrutiny under our current conception of voting
rights. The final subsection will analyze and critique the components of
her argument. Additionally, a few other issues closely related to her posi-
tion will be addressed as well.
A. PROFESSOR KARLAN'S 'DISENFRANCHISEMENT AS
PUNISHMENT' ARGUMENT
A primary issue in felon disenfranchisement is whether such provisions
are punitive or regulatory in nature. 118 This is crucial because constitu-
tional limits on punishment are more restrictive than limits on regula-
tions, so if it can be proved that felon disenfranchisement laws are
punitive, they will be scrutinized under a more demanding set of legal
standards." 9 Currently, disenfranchisement statutes are regulatory, but
Professor Karlan argued that this notion is founded on a "long-since-re-
pudiated conception of the right to vote.' 120 Furthermore, the "current
conception so undercuts originally regulatory justifications for disen-
franchising offenders that only penal justifications remain.'' 11
117. Id.
118. Id.
119. Id. at 1150.
120. Id.
121. Id.
This conclusion is important because if disenfranchisement can only be justified as a
punitive measure it might violate the Eighth Amendment's prohibition on cruel and unu-
sual punishment. Karlan maintained that the Court's decision in Ewing v. California, 538
U.S. 11 (2003), may support a finding of unconstitutionality under this theory. Ewing rec-
ognized that the Constitution "does not mandate adoption of any one penological theory"
and upheld California's "three strikes law" primarily based on the necessity of incapacita-
tion when deterrence fails. Ewing, 538 U.S. at 25-26. In Karlan's view, the defendant's
recidivism-not the retributive penalty for a rather silly offense-was the linchpin of this
holding. Karlan, supra note 116, at 1165. The only suitable justification for the harsh pun-
ishment was that "he had shown that he was 'simply incapable of conforming to the norms
of society as established by its criminal law."' Id. at 1166. However, disenfranchisement is
only justifiable as a retributive measure, because "[n]either rehabilitation nor deterrence
plays any plausible role at all in justifying the disenfranchisement of former offenders." Id.
Moreover,
[iut seems unlikely that an individual who is not deterred by the prospect of
imprisonment or fines or other restrictions on his liberty will be dissuaded by
the threat of losing his right to vote, even if he were aware that permanent
disenfranchisement is a collateral consequence of a criminal conviction.
Id. at 1165-66.
Dismissing incapacitation as well, Karlan noted that only retribution is left standing.
When a punishment is justified on this basis, proportionality analysis becomes determina-
tive to its constitutionality. Id. at 1167. The gravity of the defendant's conduct will be
weighed against the harshness of the penalty imposed under today's prevailing standards of
justice. Id. at 1167-68. Treating all felons the same under disenfranchisement statutes
yields unconscionable results-all felonies are treated as equally serious though some carry
a maximum sentence and others the death penalty. Id. Furthermore, "[t]he disen-
franchised is severed from the body politic and condemned to the lowest form of citizen-
ship, where voiceless at the ballot box . . . disinherited[, he] must sit idly by while others
elect his civil leaders and while others choose the fiscal and governmental policies which
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The current conception of disenfranchisement statutes originates in the
Warren Court's pronouncement in Trop v. Dulles, which explained:
[A] statute has been considered nonpenal if it imposes a disability,
not to punish, but to accomplish some other legitimate governmental
purpose.... The point may be illustrated by the situation of an ordi-
nary felon. A person who commits a bank robbery, for instance,
loses his right to liberty and often his right to vote. If, in the exercise
of the power to protect banks, both sanctions were imposed for the
purpose of punishing bank robbers, the statutes authorizing both dis-
abilities would be penal. But because the purpose of the latter stat-
ute is to designate a reasonable ground of eligibility for voting, this
law is sustained as a nonpenal exercise of the power to regulate the
franchise. 122
Professor Karlan believed this case was decided on faulty reasoning:
Chief Justice Warren never articulated a non-penal purpose which was
served by disenfranchising offenders, 123 and he relied on the Mormon
Cases, 24 which permitted the disenfranchisement of polygamists as an
ordinary regulation.125 The conception of voting rights underlying the
Mormon Cases-that states have plenary authority to regulate the
franchise126-has since been rejected by the Supreme Court. 127
The pivotal case to the modem understanding of voting rights is Reyn-
olds v. Sims, 128 in which the Warren Court declared that "the right to vote
freely [is] the essence of a democratic society" and "any restrictions on
that right strike at the heart of representative government."'1 29 The Su-
preme Court went on to hold that voting is a "fundamental right.' 30
Thus, laws restricting the right to vote must be narrowly tailored to pro-
mote a compelling state interest.' 3 ' Furthermore, the Romer Court
stated in 1996 that it was "doubtful" that the laws upheld in the Mormon
Cases denying citizens the right to vote "because of their status" could
meet this threshold. 132
According to Professor Karlan, this has several important implications
will govern him and his family." Id. at 1168. In short, if disenfranchisement can be classi-
fied as a penal rather than regulatory measure, Karlan suspected that it cannot withstand
scrutiny under the Eighth Amendment. Id. at 1167-69.
122. Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86, 96-97 (1958).
123. "He never explained why eligibility to vote should turn on one's not having robbed
a bank." Karlan, supra note 116, at 1150.
124. Davis v. Beason, 133 U.S. 333, 346-47 (1890); Murphy v. Ramsey, 114 U.S. 15, 43(1885). See supra notes 75-80 and accompanying text.
125. Karlan, supra note 116, at 1151.
126. The Murphy Court stated that "it would be quite competent for the sovereign
power to declare that no one but a married person shall be entitled to vote." Murphy, 114
U.S. at 43.
127. Karlan, supra note 116, at 1151.
128. 377 U.S. 533 (1964).
129. Karlan, supra note 116, at 1151 (citing Reynolds, 377 U.S. at 555).
130. Id. at 1152 (citing Reynolds, 377 U.S. at 562; Dunn v. Blumstein, 405 U.S. 330, 336
(1972)).
131. Karlan, supra note 116, at 1152. See supra note 73 and accompanying text.
132. Kaplan, supra note 116, at 1152 (citation omitted).
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when considered alongside other important changes in voting law. 133
States can no longer rely on the traditional justifications for disen-
franchisement. To the extent that the state's purported justification
"fences out" a group-that is, excludes them from the franchise based on
the way they might vote-it is unconstitutional viewpoint discrimination
under Carrington v. Rash.134 Karlan thus concludes that "[t]he repudia-
tion of Davis means that denying individuals the right to vote either be-
cause they endorse criminal behavior or because they would vote to
change existing criminal laws is constitutionally impermissible." 135
Additionally, other traditional non-penal justifications for felon disen-
franchisement, such as those reasoning that they "lack the qualities of
mind or character voters ought to possess," also fail. 136 Although the
Court's holding in Lassiter137-that literacy tests are acceptable because
they "promote intelligent use of the ballot"-has never been overruled,
that decision would be decided differently today because we now know
that voting is a fundamental right. 138 Since Reynolds, the Court has con-
sistently rejected the notion that restrictions on the franchise are an ac-
ceptable way of promoting reasonable voting.139 Further, even if the
Court decided that promoting intelligent and responsible voting is a com-
pelling state interest, it cannot be achieved by disenfranchising an individ-
ual simply because he or she is less intelligent or responsible than
others.140 Title 42, § 1973aa of the United States Code makes it illegal to
deny the right to vote based on any test of literacy, education, intelli-
gence, or good character. 14' Professor Karlan thus reasoned: "If neither
good character nor intelligent use of the ballot nor support for existing
criminal laws are generally permissible prerequisites for voting, then it
would be perverse to rely on criminal convictions as evidence that indi-
viduals lack qualities that voters are not required to have.' 142
B. CRITICAL ANALYSIS
The next section examines a few key issues regarding Karlan's argu-
ments and provides a critical response. An initial matter that deserves
attention is the precedential hurdle posed by Richardson v. Ramirez.
Next, this Comment addresses Karlan's initial point that, if voting is a
fundamental right, franchise restrictions must be reconceptualized as pu-
133. Id.
134. Id.; Carrington v. Rash, 380 U.S. 89, 94 (1965); see also Dunn, 405 U.S. at 354-56
(rejecting arguments for durational residency requirements based on the state's interest in
ensuring that voters understood and shared community values and noting that such justifi-
cations had been used in the past to exclude particular political groups).
135. Karlan, supra note 116, at 1152.
136. Id.
137. Lassiter v. Northampton County Bd. of Elections, 360 U.S. 45, 51 (1959).
138. Karlan, supra note 116, at 1153.
139. Id.
140. Id. at 1153 n.29 (citing Dunn, 405 U.S. at 356; Kramer v. Union Free Sch. Dist. No.
15, 395 U.S. 621, 632 (1969)).
141. 42 U.S.C.A. § 1973aa (West 2006); Karlan, supra note 116, at 1155 n.31.
142. Karlan, supra note 116, at 1155.
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nitive measures rather than regulations. 143 This raises two specific issues.
First, if the states' plenary authority over voting rights is no longer valid,
is there any philosophical justification for felon disenfranchisement? Sec-
ond, assuming disenfranchisement can be justified as a regulatory mea-
sure, can a state carry its burden to show a legitimate non-penal purpose
for disenfranchisement that does not "fence out" individuals because of
the way they might vote? Karlan answers both of these questions in the
negative and argues that both states and courts have failed to articulate
satisfying responses to these questions. 144
This Comment, however, concludes that there are legitimate responses
to Karlan's initial challenges to felon disenfranchisement statutes. It pro-
vides several potential justifying purposes that would buttress a state's
power to disenfranchise felons under a regulatory scheme. And although
the question of whether we should disenfranchise is left unaddressed, it
appears unlikely the practice will cease due to a lack of philosophical
consistency or legitimate, non-penal interests, even under the modern
construction of voting rights.
1. Precedent and Stare Decisis
As an initial matter, any challenge to existing felon disenfranchisement
provisions must address the Supreme Court's decision in Richardson v.
Ramirez.145 Although Professor Karlan did not attack its holding di-
rectly, the precedential value of this case poses a critical roadblock to her
arguments. Ramirez is clearly established law that has been repeatedly
affirmed and followed. 146 The most important recent Supreme Court de-
cision pertaining to election law, Romer v. Evans, supports the Ramirez
holding. 147 While striking down a Colorado constitutional provision that
nullified protections based on sexual orientation, the majority took a star-
tling step by explicitly affirming the legitimacy of felon disenfranchise-
ment.148 The Court stated that, to the extent the Davis v. Beason holding
stood for the principle that a convicted felon may be denied the right to
vote, it is "unexceptionable."'' 49 The Court cited Ramirez as support for
this proposition.150 The forcefulness of this statement would be difficult
for a reviewing court to ignore, and its importance is accentuated by the
names of the Justices who signed it: Kennedy, Stevens, O'Connor, Sou-
ter, Ginsburg, and Breyer151-the Justices whose judicial philosophy
would seem to make them most receptive to reconsidering Ramirez.
143. Id. at 1150.
144. Id. at 1155.
145. See supra note 81 and accompanying text.
146. See Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620, 634 (1996) (stating that to the extent Davis held
that a convicted felon may be denied the right to vote it is "unexceptionable"); Hunter v.
Underwood, 471 U.S. 222, 233 (1985); Lewis v. United States, 445 U.S. 55, 66 (1980).




151. See id. at 623.
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Further, the doctrine of stare decisis suggests that the Court should not,
under its own framework for reviewing cases, reconsider the holding of
Ramirez. Stare decisis, a Latin term meaning "to stand by that which is
decided," dictates that precedential decisions are given great weight.152
The Court explained the framework for stare decisis analysis in Planned
Parenthood v. Casey describing four factors which, if present, provide a
basis for reconsidering a prior holding.153 First, the Court examines
whether the central rule of the case has proven unworkable, or whether
"the rule's limitation on state power could be removed without serious
inequity to those who have relied upon it or significant damage to the
stability of the society governed [by the rule in question]."'1 54 Further-
more, the Court looks to see whether the doctrine has been abandoned
by society and, finally, whether the factual premises supporting the hold-
ing have fundamentally changed such that the central holding of the pre-
cedent is unjustifiable or irrelevant. 155
These Stare decisis factors fail to expose a need to reconsider Ramirez.
Forty-eight states and the District of Columbia enforce felon disen-
franchisement laws, 156 so it would be far-fetched to argue that the Rami-
rez doctrine is unworkable, abandoned, or can be abrogated without
undermining the reliance states have placed on its validity. Ramirez is
probably most vulnerable to the final factor. The dissent in that case ar-
gued Justice Rehnquist's opinion was analytically flawed, and scholars
often agree;157 this apparent flaw could perhaps be exploited before the
Court. The Court may be open to arguments that facts underlying the
application, purpose, or effect of these statutes have changed since Rami-
rez was decided. 15 8 However, such challenges have a poor record thus far
in appellate courts, and the Supreme Court has repeatedly denied certio-
rari to several such cases. 159 It is far more likely that the Court would
balance this controversial argument against strong evidence supporting
the continued validity of the holding. Nearly every state has adopted a
felon disenfranchisement provision of some kind, many in recent years.' 60
More importantly, many more states have scaled down the severity of
their statutes, and very few permanently disenfranchise felons today. 16'
It appears that the legislatures are effectively responding to shifting socie-
tal standards, so there is a strong argument that the Court should not
152. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1443 (8th ed. 2004).
153. Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 854 (1992).
154. Id. at 854-55.
155. Id.
156. See supra notes 41-58 and accompanying text.
157. See, e.g., John Hart Ely, Interclausal Immunity, 87 VA. L. REv. 1185, 1185-87
(2001).
158. See supra notes 152-55 and accompanying text.
159. See, e.g., Muntaqim v. Coombe, 366 F.3d 102, 130 (2d Cir. 2004), cert denied, 543
U.S. 978 (2004); Ortiz v. Phila. Office of the City Comm'rs, 28 F.3d 306, 318 (3d Cir. 1994);
Irby v. Va. State Bd. of Elections, 889 F.2d 1352, 1360 (4th Cir. 1989), cert. denied, 496 U.S.
906 (1990).
160. See supra notes 41-58 and accompanying text.
161. Id.
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interfere; to do so would be unnecessary and violate principles of
federalism.
2. The Regulatory Nature of Disenfranchisement
Professor Karlan mounted a compelling case that, in view of the
Court's declaration that voting is a fundamental right, restrictions on the
franchise should be re-rationalized. 162 Traditional notions that states
have plenary authority over voting rights are invalidated, she argued, so a
new philosophical framework must be erected, and the burden falls on
states to show that they have a legitimate non-penal purpose that does
not "fence out" individuals because of the way they might vote.1 63 Since
both states and courts have failed to articulate such a purpose, Karlan
concluded that disenfranchisement must be penal rather than regulatory,
thereby exposing the statutes to fatal scrutiny.164
Because we know voting is a fundamental right, an important question
is whether fundamental rights can be revoked or suspended by a mere
regulation. The answer is clearly yes. While the Reynolds Court elevated
the importance of voting, its holding did not require states to repeal their
various franchise regulations. Organizing and controlling elections is a
complicated task, and every state must regulate the intricacies of the pro-
cess, including voter registration dates, the cutoff date, distribution of ab-
sentee ballots, voting-by-mail, early voting options, and the frequency of
voting roll "purges. ' 165 States regulate who is eligible to vote and rou-
tinely exclude aliens, children, and the mentally incompetent, as well as
felons.' 66 States also implement durational residency requirements for
voting. 167 The regulatory nature of these provisions is unassailable-
states do not punish aliens or new residents by revoking their voting
rights. Thus, on a practical level, the fact that voting rights are fundamen-
tal does not place them beyond the reach of state regulation.
a. Philosophical Justifications
i. Social Contract Theory
Another important inquiry is whether there is a philosophical theory
which can justify felon disenfranchisement as something other than
speech restrictions. Modem case law looks to Locke's social contract the-
ory for justification. 168 Under this rationale, the right to vote is revoked
from felons not because of the way they might vote, but because their
162. Karlan, supra note 116, at 1150.
163. Id. at 1149-51.
164. Id.
165. See LOWENSTEIN & HANSEN, supra note 1, at 65-67.
166. See id. at 40-46. See generally NATIONAL DISABILITY RIGHTS NETWORK, STATE
LAWS AFFECTING THE VOTING RIGHTS OF PEOPLE WITH DISABILITIES (2004), available at
http://ndrn.org/issues/voting/resourses/state-voting__rights-MD-laws%5B062304%5D.pdf
(2004).
167. See LOWENSTEIN & HANSEN, supra note 1, at 41.
168. See, e.g., Wesley v. Collins, 791 F.2d 1255, 1261 (6th Cir. 1986).
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citizenship status is demoted or destroyed as a consequence of their crim-
inal behavior. In the words of the Sixth Circuit, "[a] man who breaks the
laws he has authorized his agent (the legislature) to make for his own
governance could fairly have been thought to have abandoned the right
to participate in further administering the compact. '169 Judge Friendly of
the Second Circuit articulated this idea more thoroughly, explaining:
The early exclusion of felons from the franchise by many states could
well have rested on Locke's concept, so influential at the time, that
by entering into society every man "authorizes the society, or which
is all one, the legislature thereof, to make laws for him as the public
good of the society shall require, to the execution whereof his own
assistance (as to his own decrees) is due." A man who breaks the
laws he has authorized his agent to make for his own governance
could fairly have been thought to have abandoned the right to par-
ticipate in further administering the compact. 170
Several scholars, however, have attacked social contract theory justifi-
cations. 171 They argue that, taken to their logical conclusion, these justifi-
cations cannot be reconciled with the current conception of citizenship.172
Modern liberal theory holds that certain fundamental rights cannot be
forfeited or "bargained away" in a contract. 173 Further, the formulation
of social contract theory cited by Judge Friendly is unduly narrow, focus-
ing only on the suppression of undesirable behavior and failing to account
for the parallel goal of promoting freedom and development. 174 Even
under this narrow theory, however, they argue that disenfranchisement is
unconscionable, because Locke's theory essentially requires that a conse-
quence be rational and proportional to the severity of the action. 175 Dis-
enfranchisement, especially the permanent sort, is perceived to be an
unduly harsh penalty.
Without addressing the merits of these criticisms, however, one can
conclude that they are likely insufficient to influence the legal status quo.
It is enough to note that Locke's theory is readily susceptible to diverse
interpretations. 176 Critics citing the arguments above contrast "broad"
and "narrow" versions of social contract theory as if they have meaning
in the absolute sense. But the "current" conception of social contract
theory is always changing, and courts are unlikely to find that a particular
iteration has a great deal of persuasive value.
169. Id.
170. Green v. Bd. of Elections, 380 F.2d 445, 451 (2d Cir. 1967).
171. See, e.g., Johnson-Parris, supra note 40; The Disenfranchisement of Ex-Felons: Citi-
zenship, Criminality, and "The Purity of the Ballot Box", 102 HARV. L. REV. 1300, 1304-07
(1989).
172. See The Disenfranchisement of Ex-Felons, supra note 171, at 1306.
173. See id.
174. See id.
175. Id. at 1306-07.
176. See, e.g., Alec C. Ewald, "Civil Death": The Ideological Paradox of Criminal Disen-
franchisement Law in the United States, 2002 Wis. L. REv. 1045, 1108-09 (2002); Johnson-
Parris, supra note 40, at 117-38.
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More importantly, it is not obvious that a court would reject current
legal doctrine based on these arguments, even if it decided that a particu-
lar social contract theory was "right" and incompatible with disen-
franchisement. No particular iteration has ever been incorporated into
our legal framework-it is significant that Friendly observed that states
"could have" rested their statutes on Locke's theory.177
Scholars at times behave like physicists in search of a "Grand Unifying
Theorem." However, the law is neither absolute nor static, while physical
forces favor both attributes. The Constitution did not adopt any single
political or legal theory, and the courts have never required one. The
nature of our representative democracy is that legislation will be passed
at different times based on different philosophical justifications, and in-
ternal consistency is not required. In criminal law, competing theories of
punishment are accepted in different situations. 178 A state may adopt
both retributive and rehabilitative penalties in its criminal code with the
blessing of the Supreme Court,1 79 and such inconsistency is virtually guar-
anteed in our political system. Likewise, free speech jurisprudence under
the First Amendment is composed of patchwork of various theories-
"advancing knowledge and 'truth' in the 'marketplace of ideas,' facilitat-
ing representative democracy and self-government; and promoting indi-
vidual autonomy, self-expression, and self-fulfillment.' 180  Thus,
attacking the philosophical underpinnings of felon disenfranchisement is
unlikely to change the law. Although our conception of citizenship has
evolved and it cannot any longer be revoked as a criminal penalty, it does
not follow that states must abandon all tangentially related practices. As
Justice Scalia noted: "One of the benefits of leaving regulation of this
matter to the people rather than to the courts is that the people, unlike
judges, need not carry things to their logical conclusion." 181
ii. Altman's Collective Rights Alternative
Accepting, however, that felon disenfranchisement must mesh with a
broader theory of citizenship to remain viable does not necessitate aban-
donment of the practice. While most academics conclude that the two
are irreconcilable, liberal philosopher Andrew Altman argued otherwise
in his recent treatment of the issue. 182 "[T]he current literature," he
wrote, "fails to take adequate account of a certain nontraditional argu-
ment in favor of felon disenfranchisement."' 83 His argument holds that
democracies are free to adopt, within limits, various standards for deter-
177. Green v. Bd. of Elections, 380 F.2d 445, 451 (2d Cir. 1967).
178. JOSHUA DRESSLER, UNDERSTANDING CRIMINAL LAW § 2.04 at 19-22 (3d ed. 2001).
179. See Ewing v. California, 538 U.S. 11, 29 (2003).
180. KATHLEEN M. SULLIVAN & GERALD GUNTHER, FIRST AMENDMENT LAW 4 (2d
ed. 2003).
181. Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 604 (2003) (Scalia, J., dissenting).
182. Andrew Altman, Democratic Self-Determination and the Disenfranchisement of
Felons, 22 J. APPLIED PHIL. 263, 264-67 (2005).
183. Id. at 263.
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mining who is granted and denied the right to vote. 8 4 This is part of the
collective right of citizens to "define the distinctive political identity of
their community;" policies regarding disenfranchisement are a legitimate
part of this identity.18 5 The citizens of a democratic state are under no
obligation to select morally optimal policies.' 8 6 Within the boundaries of
fair representation and protection of basic rights, a community's decisions
legitimately reflect its unique political identity.' 8 7
Altman directly addressed Professor Karlan's objections, conceding
that she is correct insofar as she states that a state's power to regulate the
franchise is no longer plenary.18 8 However, "it is perfectly consistent
with her point to hold that citizens have a collective democratic right to
determine, within limits, who is eligible to vote in their state.' 8 9 Specifi-
cally, he took issue with Professor Karlan's conclusion that once voting is
understood to be a fundamental right rather than a state-created privi-
lege, its punitive nature is "undeniable.' 190 He stated:
Karlan's reasoning is faulty. The punitive nature of disenfranchise-
ment does not follow from the denial that it is a state-created privi-
lege. One can deny that the right to vote is a privilege rather than a
right, while still holding that taking the right away from the felons is
a legitimate exercise of democratic self-determination. The right to
vote is not a privilege because all mentally competent, adult citizens
of a state have a strong presumptive claim to the franchise. Yet, ac-
knowledging the validity of such a claim does not bar one from argu-
ing that a democratic state has the right to decide whether
individuals who commit serious felonies, having already had their
right to vote presumptively recognized, are now to have that right
suspended. The suspension need not be so much a matter of meting
out punishment as making a statement about the standards to which
the state will hold each citizen if she is to retain her claim to be a full
and equal member of the political community.191
While Altman favored limiting disenfranchisement to the period of incar-
ceration, he recognized that such distinctions are exercises in line-draw-
ing that do not have well-defined limits or solutions.1 92 Thus, current
felon disenfranchisement provisions can in fact be reconciled with a mod-
em conception of voting as a fundamental right.
b. Legitimate Non-penal Purposes of Disenfranchisement
Even assuming that a philosophical justification for disenfranchisement
can be found, Professor Karlan asserted that if felon disenfranchisement
184. Id. at 267.
185. Id. at 263.
186. Id. at 264.
187. Id.
188. Id. at 265.
189. Id.
190. Karlan, supra note 116, at 1149.
191. Altman, supra note 182, at 265 (emphasis added).
192. Id.
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provisions are to stand as regulations, they must serve a "legitimate, non-
penal purpose. ' 1 93 She also launched a preemptive strike at potential
counterarguments, positing that any defense addressing the manner in
which a felon may vote would be "fencing out," a form of unconstitu-
tional viewpoint discrimination. 194 Likewise, restricting voters based on
their quality of mind is untenable in view of statutory bans on literacy or
morality tests.195
i. State Administrative Interests
Contrary to Karlan's assertions, however, it is possible for states to ar-
ticulate a legitimate, non-penal purpose for disenfranchising felons with-
out violating speech rights. One possible justification relates to
administrative and practical issues surrounding the election process.
Consider the latter portion of Judge Friendly's observations noted above,
explaining:
On a less theoretical plane, it can scarcely be deemed unreasonable
for a state to decide that perpetrators of serious crimes shall not take
part in electing the legislators who make the laws, the executives
who enforce these, the prosecutors who must try them for further
violations, or the judges who are to consider their cases. This is espe-
cially so when account is taken of the heavy incidence of recidivism
and the prevalence of organized crime.196
Although many reject this position, Friendly's justification is intuitively
appealing and likely to withstand scrutiny. While most who consider the
merits and effects of disenfranchisement immediately focus on implica-
tions for national elections, the picture looks quite different at the local
level. States have more immediate and intimate interests in felon disen-
franchisement regulations, as local events and outcomes are more sensi-
tive to changes in policy. States hold local elections for lawmakers such
as the city council and school boards. They elect law enforcement officials
such as sheriffs and district attorneys. Most states also elect state court
judges as well-the individuals who interpret the law and who personally
sentence felons in criminal cases.
Problems arise if felons are permitted to vote in this context. Elected
officials executing their duties may become the targets of felons' personal
and organized attacks. While the opponents of disenfranchisement think
it absurd that prisoners or ex-prisoners could organize a voting bloc,197
their skepticism appears misplaced when the personal element of commu-
nity crime is present, especially if voting booths are brought to prisons
themselves. Given the right to vote from the jail cell, would not candi-
193. Karlan, supra note 116, at 1150-51.
194. Id. at 1152.
195. Id. at 1153.
196. Green v. Bd. of Elections, 380 F.2d 445, 451 (1967).
197. See, e.g., Angela Behrens, Voting-Not Quite a Fundamental Right? A Look at
Legal and Legislative Challenges to Felon Disfranchisement Laws, 89 MINN. L. REV. 231,
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dates campaign there? Admittedly, it is unlikely that a candidate for pub-
lic office would run on a "pro-crime" platform in a broad sense.
However, through a narrow, gradual process, the effects of such a plat-
form could be attained. A "pro-drug" or "anti-incapacitation" political
position is certainly feasible, and it is not unreasonable to suspect that
felons would favor such a promise in greater numbers than the general
public. Particularly in a local election where turnout and voting totals are
low, there is the potential for such a bloc to corrupt the outcome of an
election, not because the way an individual might cast his vote, but the
way candidates might target and influence incarcerated groups. Such an
event would likely have an immediate and damaging effect on local elec-
tions, tainting their outcomes with anti-social influences. This rationale
may avoid the "fencing out" limitation because it is not focused on the
preferences of a voter but an illegitimate manipulation of the voting
process.
Furthermore, this scenario gives rise to a different but related reason
states may disenfranchise criminals. As Judge Kozinski stated, "[i]f states
can't exclude felons formerly incarcerated from the franchise, then they
surely can't exclude felons currently behind bars."'198 If felon disen-
franchisement becomes unconstitutional, states would likely be required
to bring voting booths to prisoners, or at least provide an absentee voting
system for incarcerated felons. This would complicate election adminis-
tration, impose heavy costs on state election commissions, and create a
new set of security issues for state governments to solve. Thus, states
have a legitimate interest in felon disenfranchisement given the adminis-
trative difficulties and expenses of providing voting booths to those in
prison. At the very least, the decision of forty-eight states to avoid the
difficulties of running polls in prisons should be respected.
ii. Lawbreakers are Not Trustworthy Lawmakers
States may also have a legitimate interest in disenfranchisement be-
cause "[iut is not too much to demand that those who would make the
laws for others-who would participate in self-government-be willing to
follow those laws themselves."' 199 Critics such as Professor Karlan reject
the notion that felons are less qualified to vote than other citizens be-
cause this simply "fences out" those with whom we do not agree, violat-
ing the First Amendment.2°° And on a broader level, critics often take
exception to using "felon status" as a meaningful proxy for anything.
Karlan asserted this herself by questioning why one's right to vote should
turn on not being a felon.201
Addressing these issues, Roger Clegg noted that felons are not the only
198. Farrakhan v. Washington, 359 F.3d 1116, 1125 (9th Cir. 2004) (Kozinski, J., dissent-
ing from denial of rehearing en banc).
199. Roger Clegg, Who Should Vote?, 6 TEX. REV. L. & POL. 159, 172 (2001).
200. See Karlan, supra note 116, at 1152.
201. Id. at 1150.
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group currently excluded from voting.20 2 States are also constitutionally
permitted to disenfranchise the mentally incompetent, the young, and
foreigners. 20 3 If these regulations do not "fence out" the viewpoints of
these groups, then on what basis are these exclusions acceptable? Clegg
argued that "we currently require only two characteristics of voters: trust-
worthiness and loyalty. '204 People have a right to determine who gov-
erns them to the extent they can be trusted to exercise that right in good
faith, sharing "a common commitment to our nation, our government,
and our laws."'205 Thus we do not allow Germans who reside in Germany
to vote-their loyalties are not to our nation, but their own.20 6 For differ-
ent reasons, children, aliens, and felons do not possess the prerequisite
qualities of trustworthiness and loyalty.20 7 "While serving a sentence dis-
charges a felon's 'debt to society' in the sense that his basic right to live in
society is restored, serving a sentence does not require society to forget
what he has done or bar society from making judgments regarding his
trustworthiness." 20 8
To support this assertion, Clegg pointed out that states routinely im-
pose collateral consequences on felons other than disenfranchisement. 20 9
Depending on the state, felons may lose the right to various entitlements,
including welfare benefits, public housing, food stamps, and the right to
possess firearms and ammunition. 210 Describing a more extreme exam-
ple, he noted that "most would agree that a public school ought to be able
to refuse to hire a convicted child molester, even after he has been re-
leased from prison."' 211 According to Clegg, each of these consequences
is based on a nexus theory linking one's status as a felon with some
broader lack of trustworthiness, evidence that our society perceives a re-
lationship between trustworthiness and criminal history.
When viewed alongside Altman's philosophical justifications, Clegg's
conclusions have traction. Deeming felons unfit to vote is not without
rational foundation, nor is it inconsistent with forbidding their participa-
tion in other civic functions. Rather, it is consistent with the right of citi-
zens to decide collaboratively what actions result in restrictions on the
right to vote. This approach does not exclude the felon from the
franchise because of the way he will vote, but because his actions show
him to be untrustworthy and therefore unfit to participate in the creation
and enforcement of our laws. Thus, it passes Karlan's "fencing out" test
202. Clegg, supra note 199, at 161-62.
203. Id.
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and provides states with a foothold for maintaining their felon disen-
franchisement statutes.
V. CONCLUSION
Admittedly, this Comment barely scratches the surface of the felon dis-
enfranchisement debate-without addressing whether states should dis-
enfranchise felons, it merely provides reasons that they could. Contrary
to recent scholarly claims, existing felon disenfranchisement statutes are
not without justification, even under our modern conception of voting
rights. The wisdom of the practice will be ultimately decided by
lawmakers and voters, and its fate is not a foregone conclusion.
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